“在中国，每天至少有上百人被精神卫生机构强制非自愿收治入院。在这些人当中，有的是通过其所涉案件的刑事程序，更多的则是经由官方的强制收治程序。毋庸置疑，对一个罹患严重精神障碍的患者是否收治，如何收治以及收治多久，是一个日益严重的世界性问题。在政府采用多种方式对公民进行拘留的中国，这些问题已被证实尤其严重。

去年，在中国的第一部《精神卫生法》生效四年多后，强制收治问题受到了公众的关注。中国媒体报道了一个长期遭受不公的受害者最终赢得了正义的新闻。随后，该故事被改编为一获奖短篇文学作品，并将拍成电影。50岁的徐为在被上海一家精神卫生机构收治入院了15年后终于重获自由。”

“Every day in China, hundreds of people are involuntarily confined in mental health facilities, some through their involvement in criminal cases, many more via the government’s civil commitment processes. Whether, how, and how long to detain the seriously mentally ill is, to be sure, a worldwide problem of increasing gravity. In China, where the government employs many types of detention, these issues have proved to be particularly troublesome.”

“也許，不僅對於當下習近平的統治集團、而且同樣對於中共本身而言，其所面臨的最嚴峻挑戰，是能否找到一套足以支撐中國對內、對外政策行動的令人滿意的意識形態。目前，中共缺少能夠指引其官方政策之形成和實施且在各方之間能夠達成共識的理念、目標和原則。也許，我們可以更為準確地講，中共在這些基本問題上出現了前所未有的衝突和困惑，中國法律體系的近期發展提供了一個很好的例子。”

“The case has sent a loud and clear warning that Taiwanese will be in danger if they cooperate in “subverting” the ­Chinese government by promoting freedoms and democracy, a lifestyle that they take for granted.”

“仲裁法院考慮了海洋法公約的語言和起草歷史、公約締結之前的海洋法談判、實踐和先前法律決定中對這一問題的有限闡述、相關的亞洲歷史發展、該地區的地理和地質情况，以及對「岩礁」這一例外情形適用狹義或廣義後可能在實踐中引起的後果，在對這些因素一一進行了非常詳盡和坦率的檢視後，仲裁法院決定：一個島嶼，如果沒有在不依靠重要的外界補給的情况下憑藉自身資源支持人類群落居住的歷史，則不應享有專屬經濟區或大陸架地位所賦予的關於海洋和海底資源的巨大特殊權利。仲裁法院表示，若不如此認定的話，將違反第121條第3款的根本目的，即「阻止國家對潛在的巨大海洋空間提出主張……以至於損害其他沿海國家的利益和／或人類的共同遺產」。”

“Although rejected not only by China but also Taiwan, the tribunal’s elaborately researched and scrupulously reasoned responses proved just as impressive. They were even more so given the difficulties imposed by China’s nonparticipation and the tribunal’s mistaken refusal to permit Taiwan’s participation, out of exaggerated deference to Beijing’s “one China” policy.”

“中国宣称对南海诸岛及其附近海域拥有“无可争辩的主权”。它拒绝接受仲裁庭即将做出的裁决，所根据的理由是此一裁决势必将处理领土主权问题（谁拥有这些争议岛屿）以及海洋划界问题（国家间海域产生冲突时应如何解决），而中国从来没有同意将这些问题交给任何第三方的公正仲裁。这个说法是严重的误导。仲裁庭已经表示，它的裁决不会决定这些问题，只会对其他重要的问题做出判断，这些重要的问题通通都涉及《联合国海洋法公约》的解释和适用，因此是落在仲裁庭的权限范围内。中国既然已经批准该《公约》，《公约》规定了强制的争端解决程序，并规范所有缔约国必须遵守争端解决的任何结果。很明确的，中国已经事先同意接受仲裁庭的决定。”

“Although any outcome can be arbitrarily dismissed as ‘debatable’, if properly understood there should be no doubt that despite Beijing’s endlessly repeated denunciations of the tribunal’s legitimacy — and even the competence and fairness of the arbitrators — China will be legally bound by the tribunal’s decision.”

“北京和台北反对日本的主张无疑是正确的。“冲之鸟礁”在高潮时比两张单人床大不了多少。声称日本有权基于该岩礁控制大约15万平方法定英里区域内的经济资源的观点，一直以来都被认为是荒谬的，这一区域几乎与日本的国土面积相当。即便是菲律宾案的仲裁庭在南中国海情势中对《联合国海洋法公约》第121条第3款的用语作出宽松的解释，无论如何都不可能正当化日本声称“冲之鸟礁”拥有经济专属区的主张。”

“Beijing and Taipei are surely correct in rejecting Japan’s claim. The idea that Okinotori is entitled to control the economic resources of a sea covering roughly 150,000 square statute miles, an area about the size of Japan itself, has always been preposterous. No matter how generously the Philippine arbitration tribunal might interpret the terms of UNCLOS Article 121.3 in the context of the South China Sea, it will not justify Japan’s claim.”

“针对仲裁庭即将发布的最终仲裁结果，北京会如何应对？默默地无视仲裁结果的做法似乎并不可行。一些人猜测，一个基本上不利于中国的仲裁决定可能会引起中国以退出《海洋法公约》这一戏剧性的方式来表达不满，根据规定，在提前一年进行通知的前提下，这种做法是被允许的。但是，脱离公约并不能适时免除中国遵守仲裁决定的义务。比起不遵守仲裁决定，退出公约是对国际社会仲裁结果的极端反应，会对中国的声誉造成更久远的损害。中国也会失去未来影响《海洋法公约》发展的机会，而《公约》又恰恰事关对北京相当重要的诸多问题。

似乎更有可能的是，北京方面会继续通过官方和非官方的声明来贬低仲裁裁决，对其在管辖权和实体问题上的合法性提出质疑。而且，北京方面尽管自己选择不参与设立仲裁庭的程序，但是已经试图质疑仲裁庭的组成过程，甚至抨击仲裁人的独立性和公正性。中国外交部最近谴责该仲裁案是“披着法律外衣的政治挑衅。”当然，此类做法只会进一步伤害中国追求的所谓软实力。”

“我个人一直希望马英九除此之外，还可以做得更多。我希望中华民国，至少在遥远的未来得以通过外交手段或者国际法判决正式解决太平岛的领土状态之前，可以将该岛变成一个和平解决东亚纠纷的中心。太平岛应当成为举办相关国际会议、开展联合研究项目和持续多边讨论和谈判的场所。

这个想法得到台湾政府内外国际法专家的不少支持。通过将这个想法付诸实施，台湾可以向北京和世界展示，真正希望推动人道目的的国家是如何利用争议岛屿的。”

“The immediate future looks dim for legal reform in China. A little-known fact highlights what might have been. Xi Jinping’s father, the famous political leader Xi Zhongxun, was placed in charge of the country’s legislative reform from 1981 to 1983 after returning from many years of ostracism and vilification during the Cultural Revolution. Bitter experience had led the elder Xi to recognize the importance of freedom of discussion, allowing people within the party and outside the party to speak freely, even if their ideas contradicted the policies and programs of the current leadership. He advocated enacting a law to protect differing opinions and to prevent people from suffering criminal punishment, or ouster from the party, or other sanctions for expressing disagreement with the leadership. The elder Xi openly recognized that, in order to maximize progress, China had to allow differences of opinion. Today, sadly, his son rejects that good example and demands “absolute loyalty” from would-be law reformers — and everyone else.”

“不幸的是，中国的律师仍然面临着这种进退两难的困境。参与社会转型，走向民主是一回事；而当这个转型滑向变本加厉的独断时，则是另一回事。我希望习近平可以参考他明智的父亲习仲勋的建议。当年，在饱受毛泽东主义多年迫害之后，习仲勋重新回到共产党的领导层。他在1980年代早期曾号召通过一部法律以保护每一个人——无论是党内精英还是普通公民——公开与领导层持不同意见的权利。

假使习近平可以实现他父亲的政策，那么中国走向民主的转型前景将会更加明亮，中国律师的未来也会更加明亮。但是，从目前的情况看，我希望即使是在手脚依然被束缚的情况下，公共律师们也能够继续斗争。如果他们加入了职业化法律牙医的队伍，将无疑是一场悲剧！”

“就中华人民共和国的观点而言，蔡英文的胜利，将考验习近平作为大陆领导人的成熟度。习近平政府已经被很多问题困扰。除了台海局势之外，北京面临的内忧外患纷繁复杂，军队、外交领域的既成势力、经济精英集团、异议分子群体等因素都造成了内部紧张。在这种情况下，对于本次选举即将开启的充满挑战性的两岸关系新时代，习近平政府将不得不采取谨慎和渐进性的应对态度。”

“If Tsai wins the election, I hope that human rights will enjoy greater prominence in cross-strait relations”

“事實上，非政府勞工組織在解決這類糾紛上發揮著積極作用。中國的資方在處理罷工問題時，常常忽視工人的要求，而去向官方求助幫忙。官方則越來越多地派遣警察去將工人暴打一頓，或者抓走罷工領導。相比之下，在利得案中，非政府勞工組織給罷工的工人建議，如何明確闡述他們的要求，選舉工人代表，組織同資方集體談判，進而解決了一些根本問題，有時甚至協助雙方在如何促進將來勞資關繫上達成一致。”

“In fact, labor NGOs play a productive role in resolving such disputes. Chinese employers often “handle” strikes by ignoring workers’ demands and contacting the authorities, who increasingly send in police to rough up workers and detain strike leaders. By contrast, as in the Lide case, labor NGOs advise strikers on how to formulate their demands, elect representatives and engage in collective negotiations with employers to resolve the underlying violations, and sometimes even assist in reaching agreements governing future relations.”

“浦的刑罚是不是真的能被视为“轻微”？毕竟，尽管身患严重疾病，他还是被拒绝给予中国法下相当于保释的权利，况且他还忍受了长达19个月的审前羁押。中国的羁押条件往往迫使嫌疑人决定认罪，为的就是能够尽快在终审判决之后转移到规制较好的监狱。
定罪带来更严重的后果则是，浦志强将失去从事法律职业的资格。这不仅会严重压缩他的收入，而且还会消减他在法庭中能够为人权做出的贡献。此外，如浦律师最有名的客户、异见艺术家艾未未所指出，在政治上，浦律师还会失去“他向来为那些无力发声的人仗义执言的平台”。”

“Can Pu’s sentence really be considered “mild”? After all, he had been denied China’s equivalent of bail, despite serious health problems, and had already endured pre-trial punishment for 19 months. Chinese detention conditions often lead suspects to plead guilty simply to hasten their transfer to the usually better-regulated conditions of prison that follow final sentencing. Moreover, as a consequence of conviction, Pu will lose his licence to practise law. This severely constricts his income. It also eliminates both his courtroom contributions to human rights and, as his most famous client, the dissident artist Ai Weiwei (艾未未), has pointed out, the political “platform from which he has given voice to the voiceless”.”

“我希望这次峰会能够使美国人民，除了充分意识到中国崛起，对于台湾在过去一代完成的巨大进步也有所了解，特别是，美国人至少应当意识到，一个华人的政治法律文化制度有能力发展出一个可行的民主体系，有效地保护国际法保障的政治和公民权利。聪明的政治策略和友善的姿态显然使马英九在习近平和新加坡东道主（即便是新加坡自身也还未达到台湾的自由程度）面前，不刻意夸耀台湾在这方面的成就。但台湾这一代的安全取决于美国人民和他们的政治家、官员对这个岛屿未来发展的支持，而台湾自身的民主成就，是游说美国持续支持最有说服力的理由。”

“我认为马英九总统主要是想树立一个强调过程、具有象征意义的先例。他并不意在取得任何实质性的结果，而且他现在也不在这样一个可以进行实质性谈判的政治位置上。我相信马英九希望开拓一系列持续性的领导层会晤，借此加强海峡两岸的沟通，激发两方的政府部门将注意力集中在合作上，并希望这些合作比他第二任期间的合作更具创造性。这次与习近平的会晤是马英九继第一任期后在加强两岸交流合作方面成就的顶峰。马政府第一任内通过创新的方式，使台湾在与其对手中国大陆谈判中不失平等和尊严，这是令人钦佩的巨大成就，但台湾人民和国际社会给予马英九的赞许太少。这次会晤是否能成为一次真正的先例，而不是昙花一现，甚至是个错误，将取决于马的继位者——不管是“他”还是“她” ——能否在这次会晤的基础上有所建树。”

“I agree with Andrew Nathan’s analysis of the M-X meeting. Moreover, I want to endorse the desirability of the meeting despite the understandable anxieties it has provoked in Taiwan. I do not think the meeting’s outcome, which is likely to be modest—yet important—will vindicate the many concerns that have been voiced on the island.”

“中國政府在國內和海外一直宣稱要推進依法治國，但港大事件卻讓這個承諾蒙上陰影。《中英聯合聲明》和《基本法》確保香港院校自主和學術自由。根據基本法第137條：「各類院校均可保留其自主性並享有學術自由。」關於任命陳教授這位傑出法律改革倡導者的爭議，曠日持久，這無疑是對中國就法律改革的承諾以及香港在促進中國法治進程中所扮演的歷史性角色的莫大諷刺。”

“It is dismaying to learn of the pressures now faced by Hong Kong academics who are perceived to be critical of certain Chinese central government policies. Recent developments at the University of Hong Kong have been particularly disturbing.”

“习显然认为，要想成功净化中国的自然环境和道德环境、转型中国的经济、平息广泛的动荡并实现他自矜的“中国梦”，一丝一毫的公共批评、多元意见和自主权都不应被允许。这就是中国对互联网和社交媒体的压制与操纵愈演愈烈的原因，也是习持续镇压非政府组织及其工作人员、迫害人权活动家和抓捕上百位愿意为他们辩护的律师的原因，这同样是当局亵渎越来越受大众欢迎的基督教教堂，以及残酷镇压西藏和新疆少数民族的原因。”

“After dealing with this week’s challenging U.S. agenda, which is set to cover cyberespionage and intellectual property theft, the South China Sea, Taiwan and international law, currency valuation and bilateral investment negotiations, human rights and repatriation of Chinese both wanted and unwanted by Beijing, Xi will return to yet another domestic celebration — the Oct. 1 holiday marking the 66th anniversary of the People’s Republic. Yet, when all the hoopla has ended, he will have to ask himself, as the insecure dictators of Taiwan and South Korea asked themselves 30 years ago: How long can any modernizing authoritarian regime rely on repression to cope with the mounting problems magnified by the very economic and social progress it has promoted?”

“I am a great believer in Sino-American cooperation. Like many Americans I support Xi Jinping’s remarkable campaign against corruption. I would be happy to rid the United States of genuinely corrupt fugitives from any country, including China. Yet, unless China experiences another Cultural Revolution or a slaughter of its youth similar to that of June 4, 1989, I cannot imagine a worse time for the two countries to negotiate an extradition treaty.”

“过去几年，美中两国曾就双方共同关注的网络安全问题展开最高级别的政府间对话。这些对话致力于通过发展规范来改善双边关系。然而迄今为止，进展甚微。中国新颁布的《国家安全法》和《网络安全法（草案）》揭示了造成目前僵局的原因之一。”