The PRC Legal System’s Unobtrusive International Impact

By Jerome A. Cohen

Agreements between the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Political-Legal Commission (CCPPLC) and foreign governments are a little-known but important aspect of the PRC legal system’s quiet international impact. The agreement between China and Belarus (中共中央政法委员会与白俄罗斯总统办公厅法治领域合作协议) is an interesting example of the CCPPLC directly making an agreement and cooperating with the President’s Office of a foreign government. The agreement was made between Meng Jianzhu, then Secretary of the CCPPLC, which controls the judiciary and Chinese intelligence and security services, and Stanislav Zas’, State Secretary of the Belarusian Security Council. Although the report published in the PRC court newspaper gives this interaction the appearance of innocuous and benign support for the “rule of law” and “judicial reform,” the excellent scholarly analysis by Ms. Nadège Rolland makes clear that this cooperation is an example of the export of the PRC’s surveillance and internal security system of repression. Belarus appears especially concerned with improving its censorship and cybersecurity, which the PRC is famed for perfecting.

From the diplomatic point of view, it is striking to see a Chinese Party organization concluding an agreement with a foreign government. Functionally, of course, this makes perfect sense since the Party organization controls the PRC government agencies involved, in this case the ministries for national security, state security and justice, as well as the procuracy and the courts. How much influence the CCPPLC has over other related government security and military agencies is also worthy of study. In the days of the USSR, the CCPPLC might have made a comparable Belarus agreement with that country’s Communist Party counterpart.

The PRC-Belarus cooperation cited above took place in 2016-2017. That was just before the PRC established its innovative National Supervisory Commission (NSC), a powerful new government institution for investigating and disciplining not only all Party members but also a broad swath of non-Party officials. Since the NSC seems to be more powerful than the government’s political-legal system, it would be good to know the extent to which the NSC might be affecting current cooperation with foreign governments regarding the “rule of law” and “judicial reform” as well as the CCPPLC’s present role in this respect.

The Party Central Political-Legal Affairs Commission’s comments on Hong Kong

By Jerome A. Cohen

Following the surprise public pledge of China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) to “fully direct and support Hong Kong police” to stop violence and chaos, which I commented on earlier in my blog, the Party Central Political-Legal Affairs Commission (Party PLC) announced that it’s very necessary for national security agencies to establish institutions in Hong Kong.

I was asked why the Party PLC makes a statement on Hong Kong. The Party PLC controls the MPS, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and other government security agencies. Since the MPS has announced that it will “direct” the Hong Kong police, the Party PLC will in fact be indirectly directing the Hong Kong police, if it does not already do so.

The Central Party authorities undoubtedly also influence the Hong Kong Government in other respects, not only via the Central Government Liaison Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office in Hong Kong but also through less public and official channels, including Party channels.

This influence inevitably reaches the Department of Justice and its Director of Public Prosecutions, which is where the decisions are made to prosecute alleged offenders on the basis of evidence produced by the police. This evidence will soon openly include information produced by the national security agencies, which have until now been quietly cooperating with the Hong Kong police.

This in no way formally impinges upon the independence or jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts. I have seen no evidence of Party infiltration of the Hong Kong courts or Hong Kong Government interference with the courts. Of course, there is need for further investigation and analysis of the meaning of “interference”. In every legal system, and that of Colonial Hong Kong was no exception as I know from personal experience dating from 1963, courts operate within their particular political, social and economic as well as legal contexts, and judges, individually and collectively, are not unaware of the local context or devoid of personal relationships and ambitions. In particular, it will be interesting to learn, if we can, whether MPS or MSS agents or, much more likely their intermediaries, will attempt to contact Hong Kong judges. Representatives of the security agencies are not likely to issue Hong Kong judges the “invitations to tea” so dreaded on the Mainland, but don’t rule out amiable dinners with mutual friends!