Thoughts about Brittney Griner's case in comparison with criminal prosecutions of foreigners in China

By Jerome A. Cohen

The US has lumped Griner’s case together with those of other Americans “wrongfully” detained abroad including in China. The USG has recently said Griner is being held in “intolerable circumstances”. Yet I have seen no explanation why Griner’s detention has been deemed wrongful. Was it politically motivated? Are others who bring in cannabis, as she admittedly did, usually exempted from detention and prosecution? Is it because she has unreasonably been denied bail pending trial? Is it because she has indeed been subjected to intolerable conditions in detention? The US Deputy Chief of Mission in its Moscow Embassy, even while repeating the “wrongful” accusation, has reported that Griner has been reading and doing well in detention.

Observers of Chinese criminal justice must be interested in comparisons with the Griner trial. A US diplomat who can attend the trial and chat with the accused and hand her a letter from President Biden? Media that report on the trial and statements of the accused? Defense lawyers who can discuss the case with the media? A trial that drags on for many days in the kind of case that Chinese courts – and most others – would dispose of in a couple of hours, especially when the defendant pleads guilty?

It would be good to hear more from the US State Department and specialists in Russian criminal justice in order to enhance our appreciation of what is going on. Specialists in Chinese criminal justice should also feel provoked to comment on the need for more facts and on how the same case might be handled in China.

Xiao Jianhua's "Trial"

Even by PRC standards, Xiao’s mistreatment is extraordinary, and any pretense to now resort to a belated “trial” in an effort to legitimize what has been done to him makes a farce of the Chinese legal system. Xiao’s brazen kidnapping from his Hong Kong hotel home five and a half years ago was a warning to all that Hong Kong was no longer a safe haven from the reach of Beijing’s secret police. Since then, at least until recently, he has been held in military captivity without any pretext of legal authority. Canada has proved helpless in assisting this Canadian citizen and his family, and the PRC has shamelessly violated the Sino-Canadian consular agreement (Not for the first time–recall the recent cases of the “two Michaels”). It seems evident that Canadian consular officials were banned from attending today’s “trial” even though their government, in its embarrassment, has not admitted this latest PRC violation. We do not even know what Xiao has been charged with. For the Canadian Government to withhold from the public what it knows on the ground that it is protecting Xiao’s privacy is ludicrous.

Some Questions about the Cheng Lei Prosecution

By Jerome A. Cohen

Since Thursday’s secret trial of the Australian journalist Ms. Cheng Lei, I have seen little mention of the case. Yet, as we await the Beijing court’s decision, many questions persist. Since acquittal would be a stunning surprise, I hope that quiet negotiations are taking place between the Australian and Chinese governments that will limit the sentence to prison time already served plus immediate deportation. Alternatively, her immediate release and deportation could be rationalized on the ground of alleged need for foreign medical attention even though she may be formally sentenced to a longer stretch in prison.

There are many precedents for both possible outcomes in the PRC, which regards such results as acceptable in cases that have aroused foreign outrage. Criminal conviction and sentencing are seen to vindicate PRC justice and sovereignty, and the defendant’s subsequent release is portrayed as a demonstration of Chinese munificence. I assume that the hope for leniency accounts for the apparent failure of the Australian Government to protest the exclusion of its ambassador from attending the trial as a blatant violation of the Australian-Chinese consular treaty as well as for the general reasons cited by the ambassador.

I have not seen Ambassador Graham Fletcher’s full statement issued outside the courthouse, nor any subsequent statement of his government, but the report on the case by Alice Uribe in the Wall St. Journal is worth noting. It is good to know that Ms. Cheng was allowed a recent consular visit while in pre-trial detention and that she appeared to be doing well in the circumstances, although denied the opportunity to speak with her children. It is also good to know that she is being defended by very competent lawyers of her choice. But on what basis did the ambassador conclude that the lawyers “are doing their job well”?

Has he discussed the case in detail with the lawyers? Have they had unfettered access to their client and been allowed to conduct an independent investigation? If they have received a copy of the indictment, as required by Chinese law, were they permitted to discuss it with the ambassador as well as their client? Did the lawyers themselves know the basic facts alleged so that they could at least seek to prepare a credible defense?

In many such cases defense lawyers are not allowed to share information about the case even with those who have retained them to represent the accused. And, since the trial, have the lawyers been permitted to report to Cheng’s family and the ambassador what took place at the brief secret trial? As Ambassador Fletcher rightly said outside the courthouse Thursday: “We can have no confidence in the validity of the process, which is conducted in secret.”

One thing the ambassador stated was truly puzzling. When asked whether he believes the case is a political one, he responded: “We have no reason to make that conclusion.” What? Perhaps that remark was meant to leave open the door to a behind-the-scenes negotiation leading to Ms. Cheng’s long-overdue freedom. Let’s hope so!

Hong Kong's Transformed Criminal Justice System: Instrument of Fear

Several of us were recently asked to write essays for Taiwan’s Academia Sinica on developments in Hong Kong. These will be formally published in March but, in view of the pace of events and the importance of the topic, we have been authorized to make our views available now.

HONG KONG’S TRANSFORMED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: INSTRUMENT OF FEAR

By Jerome A. Cohen*

Abstract

This essay demonstrates how recent, comprehensive changes in Hong Kong’s criminal justice system have transformed it into an instrument of fear that has understandably intimidated a formerly vibrant society into political silence. An intensive surveillance system now reaches every aspect of society. Aggressive criminal investigation techniques now invade formerly protected freedoms of expression. Aided by reversal of the traditional presumption in favor of bail pending trial, government now punishes people under the new National Security Law (NSL) by detaining them for months or years before cases are finally decided. Recent restrictions on Legal Aid limit prospects for independent criminal defense. Political operatives now decide whether and what types of NSL prosecutions should be brought. Trial by jury has been eliminated for major NSL offenses, and only judges who are deemed politically reliable can adjudicate such trials. Also, appellate judges are under various pressures, and constitutional issues that were formerly thought to be the exclusive province of the Hong Kong courts are now dictated by the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress. Moreover, increasingly, local criminal procedures that do not fall under the NSL are nevertheless being adversely affected by the current obsession with national security. The NSL era’s transformation of criminal justice has effectively suppressed popular protests and democratic practices.

KEYWORDS: national security, surveillance, criminal justice, investigation, bail, jury, defense lawyers, prosecutors, judges, Constitutional Law, human rights.

Full text (PDF): http://publication.iias.sinica.edu.tw/60105122.pdf.

Seven Acquitted of "Rioting" Charges in Hong Kong

By Jerome A. Cohen

This is wonderful news to learn about the acquittal of seven accused protesters who were charged with “rioting” under traditional HK legislation that is separate from the new National Security Law for HK. One has to admire the courage as well as the analysis of Judge Sham in concluding that the HK Government failed to meet its burden of proving the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. One also has to recognize the vigorous, talented defense presented by able HK barristers, who are still free to challenge the prosecution, at least in cases that are not brought under the NSL.

We won’t have to wait long to learn the consequences of Judge Sham’s decision. Judge Sham can expect to be excoriated by pro-government critics such as Tony Kwok, Grenville Cross and Henry Litton.

Will HK’s judicial administration, which is trying to support the independence of its judges without increasing Beijing’s hostility toward the courts, treat Judge Sham the way it did his colleague Judge Ho, who, after deciding against the prosecution in another recent case, was transferred to a higher-paying job that removed him from deciding cases? To engage in such a ploy again would subject the court system to justifiable criticism from liberal observers as well as from HK judges themselves.

What impact Judge Sham’s decision will have on the HK Department of Justice and its Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) will be important to note. There are almost 700 more “rioting” cases slated to come before the courts. Will the DPP review them all in the light of Judge Sham’s decision and give up on prosecuting those cases that seem as unpersuasive in their evidence against the accused as in the acquittal of the “Hong Kong 7”? Will the DPP instead try to prosecute some of these remaining cases as lesser offenses? 

The DPP himself has been under enormous pressure from the pro-Beijing camp because of public criticism of his department, by former deputy police commissioner Tony Kwok and others, for allegedly being insufficiently zealous in bringing prosecutions against so-called “rioters” and other protesters. Indeed, the DPP has announced his resignation, to take effect at year’s end, apparently because, among other things, he has been frozen out of prosecutions to be brought by the DOJ against alleged violators of the NSL at the behest of the new security-focused unit that the NSL has implanted in the DOJ.

Questions abound. Will other HK judges follow the example of Judges Sham and Ho? And how much pressure will now be brought on HK human rights barristers and the very dynamic Bar Association that has repeatedly pointed out the many legal failings of the NSL?  

Given their long record of repression of human rights lawyers in Mainland China, the agents of the Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of State Security now publicly ensconced in HK by the NSL are not likely to show much tolerance for continuing shows of independence by HK’s human rights lawyers and judges.

The Latest from Grenville Cross on the HK 12

By Jerome A. Cohen

Here is another piece in China Daily by the former Director of Public Prosecutions for the Hong Kong Government, the formidable lawyer and defender of the new national security regime in the SAR, Grenville Cross. He is always worth reading, since he offers detailed insights into the operations of HK’s justice system and also into prospects for future enforcement. Although much of the current piece becomes a diatribe against protests in America and the UK and their unrealistic appeals for the immediate return of the HK 12 to HK, there are a few points worth noting.

Cross makes a valiant effort to equate criminal justice in Mainland PRC with criminal justice in HK, America, and the UK and makes the obvious point that “criminals who break the law in China must expect to face justice…Those who commit grave offenses will be placed on trial, and it is no different in China. Criminal justice must be respected and politicking by malevolent foreign forces can never be allowed to interfere with the due process of law in any part of China.”

Ringing words but abysmally hollow in their application to Xi Jinping’s PRC regime. Criminal justice is very different in China!

In his recitation of relevant facts, Cross mentions the shock and concern expressed by the HK families of the detainees but he fails to mention that a basic reason for their anguish was that, on September 30, five weeks after their family members had been detained incommunicado, the PRC was still preventing their access to Chinese defense lawyers the families had retained. Nor does Cross mention that now, another month later, the PRC has formally forbidden involvement of the five Chinese law firms that have been retained to assist the suspects. And he says nothing about the government’s promise to appoint defense lawyers satisfactory to the government (if not the accused). That, as often occurs, will happen once the police investigation is complete and the suspects, often after torture and other pressures, have been forced to confess, sometimes on TV.

It would indeed be wonderful if those detained in China could expect “justice.” It would indeed be wonderful if a PRC trial were a fair trial and if PRC criminal justice deserved respect, but it is the current Communist leaders, not foreign politicians, who are interfering with “due process of law” in China. If Xi Jinping, given his efforts to rely on China’s past as justification for its present, were to openly justify torture, which was first legally abolished by Chinese reformers over a century ago but is still widely practiced on the Mainland, would Cross continue to ask the world to respect “Chinese justice”? And Xi does openly preach and practice Party control over the courts.

Yet the families of the detained might glean some glimmer of hope from the Cross essay. Although Cross fails to mention that, at the outset of the case, the PRC could have exercised its right to send the suspects back to HK for prosecution on the more serious charges facing them there, he does mention that they will be sent back after the Mainland criminal “proceedings” are over. The PRC has discretion, of course, to decide the point when that will be. The defendants could be returned to HK to serve whatever punishments are meted out by the PRC courts or they could be made to first complete their sentences in the Mainland. 

For most defendants in this case the difference may not be great. By the time the trial proceedings are concluded, the one-year prison sentences that most of the 12 can expect may almost have already been served while awaiting trial, since none has thus far been granted the PRC equivalent of bail. But the difference could be significant for the two suspects who have been charged with organizing the illegal border crossing, not merely taking part in it, since they face a maximum seven-year sentence.

Hong Kong Further Erodes Freedom of Speech

By Jerome A. Cohen

Tam

Tam Tak-chi. Photo: Tam Tak-chi, via Facebook.

Earlier this week, the activist Tam Tak-chi was denied bail after being charged with “uttering seditious words and disorderly conduct.” Tam is reportedly the first person charged with sedition in Hong Kong since its 1997 “handover” to China. There is a risk for the Hong Kong government in bringing this case under pre-existing local sedition legislation, since the facts cry out for judicial protection of speech, and the HK courts may seize the occasion to demonstrate that, no matter the constraints imposed on them by the new National Security Law (NSL), when not under the NSL, they still maintain their independence despite HK’s newly-repressive climate. Two points are worth emphasizing.

First, it would be interesting to know how the decision to prosecute was made in the Department of Justice (DOJ), specifically whether it was approved by the current Director of Public Prosecutions, who has announced his resignation as of the end of the year because of apparent DOJ refusal to allow him, rather than the special NSL group newly-established within the office, to deal with NSL cases. He reportedly hasn’t even been allowed to know about NSL decisions concerning prosecution until they have been made. I wonder how optimistic he is about the successful prosecution of Tam under ordinary, pre-NSL HK law.

The second point to focus on is the denial of bail, which to me is the most immediately disturbing aspect of the case. I hope to know what’s been made public about the denial of bail and whether the bail appeal process has now run its course. The outcome of the legal contest that lies ahead is uncertain and will tell us a lot about the impact of recent events on HK’s judiciary and the extent to which Beijing will tolerate HK judges’ independent responses to the new challenges. In the interim, however, this HK political activist will be detained in jail, at least for two more months, and is already being punished long before it is determined whether he deserves it. This certainly prevents him from further exercising freedom of speech, inhibits his full opportunity to fashion his legal defense and disrupts his normal life and work and that of his family and colleagues. The prosecution power is a dreadful one.

China's Criminal Justice System Again Takes Center Stage

By Jerome A. Cohen 

I just published an article in The Diplomat discussing many of the questions that are raised by the Chinese criminal justice system. The recent detentions of Professor Xu Zhangrun and Ms. Geng Xiaonan and her husband, the continuing repression of mainland Chinese dissidents and minorities, and the plight of the “Hong Kong 12,” detained while fleeing to Taiwan, illuminate some of the system’s many problems. You can read the article here.

Invisible punishment of countless people in China

By Jerome A. Cohen

Human Rights Watch’s Sophie Richardson just wrote an article, Chinese Authorities Torment Activist’s Dying Mother. It’s a representative example of the kinds of informal but harsh punishments to which countless people are invisibly subjected in China, without a shred of legal pretense. One can only speculate about the numbers of victims of this lawlessness, usually inflicted by the secret police or their thugs.

When the PRC National People’s Congress meets in a few weeks, in their annual reports the President of the Supreme People’s Court and the Procurator General will each rattle off endless statistics about the millions of cases their respective institutions have formally processed. Yet no one will report on the millions of people who suffer daily humiliating, unregulated restrictions on their personal freedoms. The Ministry of Public Security should certainly report on this important aspect of its massive activity, but it also does nor report on its monitoring and inhibition of even the Party elite, not to mention ordinary citizens. At least this massive task provides jobs for many university graduates who might otherwise face employment problems!

Chinese justice and Japan's Carlos Ghosn case

To those familiar with criminal justice in the PRC, the Ghosn case has always been of great interest. The long detention periods allowed the police and prosecution in democratic Japan as well as totalitarian China, of course, ring a bell. So do the restrictions on access to the detained suspect, although Japan does allow a role for defense counsel if the suspect can afford one. But lawyers are not allowed to be present when the suspect is interrogated, and interrogations go on endlessly in the hope of extracting confessions.

From the outset of the Ghosn case, I was also struck by the apparent coordination between the police/prosecution and major local business interests. This is a frequent phenomenon in China. As Hong Kong, Taiwan and ethnic Chinese business people from other jurisdictions have experienced, involvement in a commercial dispute in China with Chinese partners or rivals can result in detention by local Chinese police. Local Public Security Bureau officials sometimes travel to far flung places within the country to detain non-Mainlander businessmen who, fearful of returning to the locus of their business in China for negotiation of a dispute, have erroneously believed that negotiations could be conducted safely on “neutral” turf elsewhere in the country. Once detained, the “suspect” is told that any criminal charges can be made to disappear if he is only reasonable in settling the matter. Many police fail to realize that, even in a Chinese court, promises extracted under coercion should not be legally enforceable. Or at least they and the politically well-connected local business interests that have mobilized the aid of the police realize that these cases rarely reach the courts for one reason or other or that, if they do, the same political influence that mobilized the police can also guarantee judicial cooperation. 

The Many Forms of Arbitrary Detention in China

By Jerome A. Cohen

Yesterday was International Human Rights Day. As we look back at Beijing’s human rights record this past year, one of the most troubling abuses in China continues to be arbitrary detention (I’ve written about this subject with Yu-Jie Chen, SSRN here).

Rights lawyers are often the target for such abuses. Persisting prominent examples are lawyers WANG Quanzhang and YU Wensheng, who remain in detention. Foreign critics and activists are not spared. YANG Hengjun, for example, a famous Australian-Chinese blogger, has been detained on the charge of espionage since January. Policy experts like Michael Kovrig and business people like Michael Spavor, the two Canadians detained in China after Canada arrested Huawei’s CFO in accordance with the U.S. extradition request, have been in detention for a year. Just to name a few.

The victims often suffer prolonged detention in a non-transparent process. While China’s Criminal Procedure Law provides some legal time limits on holding detained and arrested persons, there are exceptions to these limits that the police and procuracy have the liberty to invoke in practice. For example, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) can approve unlimited extensions of time for a criminal investigation! What is less clear is whether the NPCSC, when approving extensions, is supposed to issue a public notice to this effect as it does with other actions. Has the NPCSC ever done so?

Another technique for exceeding the prescribed criminal procedure time limits is for the police to restart the clock on the ground that investigation of the suspect has revealed the need to investigate another major crime that the suspect may have committed. My impression is that this has frequently been done in practice but with no systematic reporting of such important decisions to the outside world. Papers are processed within the police bureaucracy, and perhaps the procuracy is informed if it has inquired.

If police officials deign to acknowledge inquiries from a defense lawyer or family member, they might well release this often spurious “new crime” rationale for extending the detention time of a suspect whose case has been delayed for political or other meretricious reasons. But there is no way in practice for such a decision to be effectively challenged. When the case finally comes to trial, the rationale for the delayed detention might often be mentioned in the indictment and would be in the appended police documentation of the case and usually mentioned in the account of procedure rendered in the court’s judgment. Yet these are formalities, not protections.

Of course, it is important to bear in mind that in practice people are often detained in the criminal process in blatant disregard of prescribed limits (Think Gui Minhai, the Swedish national who was kidnapped from Thailand and now disappeared in the arms of Mainland police).

Moreover, with the recent introduction of the “supervision commission” process, suspects can be detained for 6 months before a decision is made about whether to turn the victim over to the formal criminal process or some other sanction.

Finally, there are also other supposedly “non-criminal” detention procedures such as those still existing for drug and prostitution offenders. Others are also detained wholly outside the formal criminal process and even outside the formal police short-term administrative detention process that annually punishes many millions of people for up to 15 days in jail. Of the more than one million Chinese Muslims who have been detained in Xinjiang’s re-education camps, only a minority have been detained under formal criminal procedures.

This is not an exhaustive list. The PRC has mastered many forms of arbitrary detention.

 

Arrest of Australian citizen in China: Beijing-Canberra tension

By Jerome A. Cohen

Protests against the formal “arrest” of former diplomat Yang turned Australian citizen are beginning to mount. Australian officials have vigorously denied the espionage charges and condemned the PRC prosecution. The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has accused Canberra of impermissible interference with PRC justice. It claims that Yang, who has been held incommunicado for more than 6 months, is being treated in accordance with Chinese law. This is true. The problem, of course, is that Chinese law violates basic precepts of international human rights law.

Although, in conformity with the Sino-Australian consular treaty, Yang’s jailers allow him monthly half-hour consular visits that are strictly limited in topics that can be discussed and monitored, they have yet to permit him access to a lawyer, even one chosen by the jailers. “Arrest” usually means the detained suspect is headed for indictment, trial, conviction and imprisonment, and the espionage charge guarantees a very long sentence, although the death penalty is always a threat.

A lawyer will eventually be provided to decorate the proceedings if the authorities refuse to allow the accused a counsel of his choice. In any event the defense lawyer’s role will be restricted and the Party-controlled court will reach the conclusions instructed by the Party leadership.

One practical issue of special interest to international lawyers is whether the PRC will allow Australian consuls to observe the trial to the extent it is deemed “secret”. In the Stern HU case some years ago the PRC violated even its own internal regulation in refusing Australia access to the secret parts of naturalized Australian Hu’s trial. The PRC should have based that determination on a valid interpretation of a disputed provision of the bilateral consular convention but instead simply sought to justify it with a reference to China’s supposedly untrammeled judicial sovereignty. Apparently that sovereignty is not even subject to international commitments made by the PRC in the exercise of its sovereignty!!

What thoughts should be inspired by the prosecution of Meng Hongwei, the former Interpol chief from China?

By Jerome A. Cohen

The Wall Street Journal had a report on the prosecution of Meng Hongwei a few days ago (“Former Interpol Chief Admits to Taking Bribes, Chinese Court Says”). Here is someone who allegedly received over US$ 2 million in bribes from 2005 to 2017 and nevertheless was selected by the People’s Republic of China in 2016 to be one of its most prestigious representatives abroad. So many questions should be raised about this case.

Were Meng’s alleged misdeeds, committed over a decade, not known at the time of his selection? How could he have previously risen to the top of his PRC institution, the Ministry of Public Security itself, without having been vetted and discovered through its formidable and frightening investigative powers? Were his misdeeds known and not considered troublesome because so common that they did not go beyond the bounds of acceptable behavior? Were they held in abeyance in order to guarantee his compliance with Party demands while at Interpol? Was it inability or refusal to execute Party demands at Interpol that led to his disappearance and prosecution?

Why did Meng return to Beijing when he could have become one of the very people the PRC has unsuccessfully sought to have Interpol help forcibly return to China? Although France has an extradition treaty with the PRC, Meng could easily have gone elsewhere. Moreover, France has signaled that it will not extradite his wife and that she warrants political asylum.

What about Meng’s prosecution? Why did the PRC choose to prosecute him and expose itself to greater international embarrassment when it could have simply kept him “disappeared” like some other sensitive “offenders” who are simply not heard from after their return to the Motherland, voluntarily or not, and who are soon forgotten abroad as well as at home?

Will the court’s forthcoming judgment reveal the details of Meng’s offenses? Will it reveal the identity of the lawyer reportedly assigned to him and the extent of the lawyer’s role both during the many months of presumably incommunicado detention Meng suffered before being brought to trial and during the trial? Did government witnesses testify at trial or were their statements merely introduced in writing? If any appeared in court, were they subject to cross-examination? Was the defense allowed to present its own witnesses in court or even gather evidence before the trial began? Will the court’s judgment be made public as ordinarily required even though the trial was closed to the public? Will Meng be allowed to appeal his anticipated conviction? Will any relatives or lawyers be allowed to visit him once he is transferred from detention to prison at the close of his case?

Will the outside world, the Chinese people or even the overwhelming majority of the Communist Party ever know the answers to these questions?

My take on Hong Kong's extradition bill

By Jerome A. Cohen

I've just written a commentary on Hong Kong's controversial extradition bill (SCMP link below). Comments are welcome, especially with regard to the solution proposed at the end of the article.

Jerome A. Cohen, If Beijing wants an extradition law with Hong Kong – and elsewhere – it should reform its judicial process, South China Morning Post, May 23, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3011117/if-beijing-wants-extradition-law-hong-kong-and-elsewhere-it

Perhaps the most frightening aspect of the impending amendment is its application, not only to all SAR citizens and foreign and Chinese residents of the SAR, but also to anyone who passes through Hong Kong.

[New Article] Law's Relation to Political Power in China: A Backward Transition

By Jerome A. Cohen 

I've just uploaded on my SSRN my latest article—"Law's Relation to Political Power in China: A Backward Transition," which is slated to appear in Social Research: An International Quarterly in the Spring of 2019.

In the article, I examine China's legal progress and regress in recent years. While noting certain legislative and judicial advances, I discuss the continuing reality of the unchecked powers of the police, the plight of Chinese human rights lawyers and the newly established National Supervision Commission that significantly expands the Chinese Communist Party’s incommunicado detention system to all deemed to be government officials.  

I'm pasting the introduction below. Comments are welcome!

Law's Relation to Political Power in China: A Backward Transition

Social Research: An International Quarterly, forthcoming 2019

Jerome A. Cohen New York University School of Law

Introduction

By and large, for the past dozen years, China’s professed transition toward the rule of law has witnessed more setbacks than progress. The extent to which the exercise of governmental power should be subject to domestic and international legal restraints continues to be a matter of enormous importance. This is true in every country and in relations among countries in our increasingly interdependent world. The earthshaking impact of Donald Trump’s election to the American presidency has made the relationship of law to power as preached and practiced by the United States a virtually universal concern. Yet, as Americans and others strive to cope with this new challenge, the world is also increasingly anxious about how a rising China—with more than four times the population of the United States and almost as much economic strength—respects the “rule of law” at home and abroad.

This essay, building on the excellent analysis by Jean-Philippe Béja (Social Research: An International Quarterly, this issue) updating his earlier overview of the political situation in the Central Realm, will focus on China’s domestic legal situation. In doing so, we must be fully aware that the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—an increasingly oppressive Marxist-Leninist dictatorship—denies foreign scholars, and even its own people, the opportunities for knowledge and analysis that American freedoms of expression and transparency offer domestic and foreign observers of the United States. I regret the limitations that these restrictions impose upon my comments.

Keywords: China, rule of law, legal reforms, human rights lawyers, police powers, National Supervision Commission

China’s ADD: Arbitrary Detention Deficit

By Jerome A. Cohen 

Cao Shunli, Courtesy of openDemocracy

Cao Shunli, Courtesy of openDemocracy

Year after year Chinese Human Rights Defenders has done a marvelous job of flagging the PRC’s human rights violations. This most recent report, 5 Years After Death in Custody of Cao Shunli, Human Rights Defenders in China Continue to Face Same Pattern of Abuse, taking off from the anniversary of one of many infamous instances of arbitrary detention and coming on the eve of next week’s UN Human Rights Council session (the Ides of March!), is long but definitely worth the time. 

Canada’s just begun extradition proceeding in Vancouver illustrates what the antidote to arbitrary detention should be — a fair and public judicial hearing. The embattled Prime Minister Trudeau was surely right in condemning the PRC for its arbitrary detention of the two Canadians in retaliation for Canada’s civilized legal process. The PRC and every other country that engages in systemic arbitrary detention give new definition to ADD, which should stand for Arbitrary Detention Deficit! For this the PRC should be brought to account in the media as well as in international legal institutions. In our interdependent world, extradition and its functional kin, whatever the label employed such as rendition, repatriation, deportation, removal etc, is intimately related in many ways to ADD, as currently illustrated in the PRC’s relations with not only Canada but also the United States, Sweden, Hong Kong, Taiwan and other jurisdictions. (See my article co-authored with Yu-Jie Chen on how the two questions are closely connected in the context of Taiwan-China cooperation as an example.)

Hong Kong, China, “Rendition” and Human Rights

By Jerome A. Cohen

Officials in Hong Kong are now planning to allow “rendition” (the Hong Kong-Mainland equivalent of  international “extradition”) of criminals to China. This would be a major change and a development that concerns Hong Kong’s special human rights protections.

The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia have not finalized extradition treaties with China largely because of their concerns about the pervasive problems in China’s criminal justice system, including arbitrary detention, torture and other cruel treatment, coerced confessions, political prosecutions, unfair trials and capital punishment, especially for nonviolent crimes. For similar reasons Hong Kong—China’s Special Administrative Region—has not been able to conclude a “rendition” agreement with the PRC Central Government.

Hong Kong’s current plan to finally move towards a full rendition agreement with the Mainland must not violate the human rights protections that it acquired while still a UK colony under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The PRC promised to honor these protections after the former colony’s return to the Motherland. They include the non-refoulement principle, which requires governments not to expel any person to another territory if this would result in exposing him to the danger of arbitrary deprivation of life, or torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (and other serious violations of human rights, including, notably, expected violations of the right to a fair trial).   

My colleague Yu-Jie Chen and I have written an article on the human rights problems in Taiwan’s cross-strait “repatriation” agreement (also similar to an extradition arrangement but, like “rendition”, applicable to relations between governments of different parts of China) with Mainland China (see Yu-Jie Chen & Jerome Cohen, "China-Taiwan Repatriation of Criminal Suspects: Room for Human Rights?," Hong Kong Law Journal (2018), SSRN link here). The lessons learned from Taiwan’s experience with the Mainland should be of interest to those who are considering whether Hong Kong should strike a“rendition” deal to send fugitives to suffer the fate of those subjected to Mainland justice. Analogies to the protections provided in conventional international extradition treaties also must be considered.

 

Conviction of Chinese human rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang

By Jerome A. Cohen

Chinese human rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang has been sentenced to four and a half years in prison for subversion. But, since we have not yet seen the court’s judgment and don’t know the details of his long detention, we cannot be certain what this sentence means.

Wang has been held in pre-trial and post-trial detention since July 2015, and detention time served is usually deducted from the sentence (with one-to-one credit for the days of regular detention and only half a credit for the days during which he was held in “residential surveillance at a designated location” or RSDL). This probably means that Wang can be expected to be released in April 2020 and perhaps even earlier, depending on how long he was confined in RSDL rather than regular criminal detention.  BUT the court may have deviated from the practice of giving credit for time already served prior to sentence, which would mean no release until mid-2023!

In light of the harsh sentences rendered to some other lawyers punished in the 709 crackdown, IF the court has followed the standard sentencing practice, it appears that the Chinese Communist Party/government has gone relatively (and unexpectedly) light on Wang. So many factors go into the sentencing decision. How has he behaved? What shape is he in? Has he made any apparently sincere commitment to abide by the secret promises usually extracted from a convicted person to be a “good boy” upon release? Has the Party decided to look lenient because of the intense world interest, the abusive and unusually lengthy pre-sentence detention Wang suffered and the current widespread international condemnation of China for its abominable misbehavior toward the three Canadians who are being punished in retaliation for Canada’s handling of America’s extradition request of the Huawei executive? 

Pressures on Wang not to appeal must be very great. Some convicted defendants decline to appeal because they know that the appeal process will not result in a favorable outcome and only extends the time they will remain confined in conditions that are often much more uncomfortable than the prison cell that awaits them once the appellate process has run its course. To be sure, we don’t know in what kind of shape Wang is mentally and physically and whether he has been subjected to any of the horrific “medical” treatment designed to break the will of so many political defendants. He may not be in condition to carefully weigh the wisdom of an appeal. If he is still capable of rational decision and retains his courageous determination, he may wish to appeal simply to avoid the inference that he accepts the decision as a correct and just one.

In any event it should be noted that only giving half sentencing credit for time served in RSDL is grossly unfair, since conditions tend to be more coercive than if the suspect is detained in an ordinary jail, even though an ordinary detention cell can be extremely uncomfortable. RSDL is not “house arrest” in one’s own home but in that of the secret police. I think double credit should be given for every day of RSDL until that vile detention practice is abolished, as it should be!!

The Code of Criminal Procedure limits RSDL to a three-month term that can be renewed once. Yet I have long suspected that police have meted out more than the maximum six-months RSDL term on some occasions by purporting to charge the hapless suspect with another “national security” offense that supposedly deserves their investigation. This may have occurred in the Wang case and perhaps the delay in issuing the judgment is related to an attempt to obscure that situation.

Wang Quanzhang, wife and son (Wang Quanxiu via AP)

U.S. should impose Magnitsky Act sanctions against China’s human rights violators

Jerome A. Cohen

Amnesty has just issued a plea for urgent action on behalf of what remains of lawyer Jiang Tianyong. Amnesty’s announcement seems understated despite the large cap title. Jiang is exposed to more than the “imminent risk of torture and other ill-treatments”. He has in actuality long been suffering from such abuse that is designed to break him as a person, to destroy him both mentally and physically. And, as we know from many cases including those of Gao Zhisheng and Wang Quanzhangthis calculated campaign to end China’s human rights lawyering seems to be gradually thinning the ranks of human rights lawyers. The many, sometimes bizarre, procedural violations in Jiang’s case are a reminder of the realities of Chinese justice when it comes to those who challenge the regime. His captors should be investigated on charges of what may well amount to “attempted murder”.

I know Jiang but have never cooperated with Wang Quanzhang, whose case appears to be even more outrageous. After three years of absolute silence about Wang’s fate the Party has reportedly decided to finally bring him to “trial” in the near future but his mental and physical condition are both in doubt, and he has not been allowed to retain his own lawyer but must accept a government-selected one.

Despite Chinese Government maneuvers to gain control over the international human rights institutions and the current relative indifference of the U.S. Government to human rights issues, greater efforts must be made to try to stop the PRC campaign against human rights lawyers. One important, if largely symbolic, response would be for the U.S. to impose Magnitsky Act sanctions against those Chinese officials who are directly responsible for executing this notorious campaign, starting at the top of the Communist Party.

Chinese police's recent re-detention of Swedish Citizen Gui Minhai: What’s the story?

By Jerome A. Cohen

Gui Minhai. Photo: Hong Kong Free Press, screenshot/CCTV.

The recent Chinese police re-detention of Mr. GUI Minhai, a Swedish citizen, when he was on the train with Swedish diplomats escorting him to Beijing, deserves more public attention than it has received. China’s action must be questioned and protested by the international community, as argued by last week’s Washington Post editorial, China’s violation of rights grows ever more brazen.   

The People’s Republic of China leaves itself open to condemnation by failing to give a public explanation of its dramatic and unusual deprivation of Gui’s freedom. This is probably because there has been some disagreement or lack of coordination in the PRC government’s control of Gui. What may have happened is that the local security police in Ningbo may have approved Gui’s trip to Beijing for medical reasons, as apparently it had approved his Shanghai trips to the Swedish Consulate there. But the central authorities, when they learned of the plan, may have panicked at the possibility that Gui might seek embassy asylum, as the blind barefoot lawyer CHEN Guangcheng did in 2012, and decided to detain Gui again to prevent that possibility. There may also have been, and still might be, a struggle between the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Security concerning jurisdiction over Gui.

I suspect we will soon see the following explanation from the PRC: Gui was living in Ningbo under “qubao houshen” (取保候审), a Chinese type of bail requiring the “released” suspect to remain in the city where he has been released and requiring him to obtain special permission for any outside trips. Although Gui has apparently completed his sentence for his earlier traffic offense, his bail must relate to the unfinished current charges for which he apparently has not yet been tried.

It is possible, of course, that the Swedish Embassy may have decided to follow the U.S. example in the Chen case and make positive efforts to spirit Gui to the embassy’s custody, but, given the Swedish Government’s quiet, conventional efforts to aid Gui to date, and to aid Peter Dahlin after his detention, that seems unlikely.

Yet, given the escort of two Swedish diplomats accorded Gui, one has to give Sweden credit at least for seeking to assure Gui better medical treatment in Beijing and for anticipating possible obstruction.

Reportedly the PRC and Sweden have differed on the degree of consular access to be permitted to Gui at various times, and these issues probably have a history going back to the original detention of Gui in Thailand, which was a brazen kidnapping. It should be noted that Sweden and China apparently do not have a bilateral consular agreement, which is odd, but both adhere to the multilateral Vienna Convention on consular relations.

These incidents involve so many as yet unanswered questions. The PRC should not remain silent even if its agencies have not yet coordinated. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as so often in these cases, was publicly embarrassed when its spokesperson implicitly admitted that it really did not know what was going on.

Certainly, the Swedish Government should reveal the full story behind its frustrations in this case and in others involving China, and Swedish public opinion should demand that the Government tell the truth now.