Questions Raised by Cheng Lei's 1,000 Days in PRC Detention

By Jerome A. Cohen

Surely the case of Ms. Cheng Lei is one of the most mysterious recent PRC violations of the personal safety of foreigners in China. Her detention raises a number of important questions that implicate different aspects of the PRC's criminal legal administration and foreign policy. 

Regarding the length of her detention, why has the regime subjected her to such indecent treatment and for so long and with such negative consequences for the PRC’s international reputation? What can explain the court’s obscene delay in sentencing her so long after the secret trial that excluded an Australian diplomatic observer contrary to the Australia-China Consular treaty? 

As for the PRC's criminal legal administration, are the PRC authorities insisting on a “confession” before sentencing, a practice that often marked the imperial Chinese system? Is there a conflict between the security and foreign affairs systems over what to instruct the court to decide? 

And from a foreign relations perspective, is the Australian Government refusing to pay a demanded political/economic price for Ms. Cheng’s release? It is frightening and sad to see Beijing conduct itself in this way as it seeks to lift its stature in the world community.

The New Amendments to the PRC's Counter-Espionage Law

The first thing to keep in mind about the amendments to the counter-espionage law – and any law in the PRC – is that the secret police are free to ignore it when they deem it desirable to do so. Despite their actions cloaked in secrecy, many cases of lawless action eventually become known to the public and to foreigners, as recent cases again illustrate.

It is encouraging to see that the forthcoming law will be amended to protect “individuals”, i.e., including foreigners, rather than only “citizens”. But no one should be foolish enough to rely on the paper protections of human rights in this legislation or the PRC’s other provisions relating to criminal justice.

Second, speculation about how the vague terms in the amended law will actually be interpreted and applied should await promulgation of a new set of Detailed Implementing Rules as well as regional and local regulations.

Third, it is unclear which of the relevant legal institutions will exercise the most power over enforcement of the law. Surely it will not be the courts. Will it be the local Communist Party Political-Legal Committee? The organs of the Ministry of State Security? Or the recently-established National Supervisory Commission and its agents? And how meaningful is it to state that espionage cases are subject to law when the Criminal Procedure Law allows criminal investigators to detain a suspect incommunicado for six months before a decision is made to initiate conventional criminal procedures and when in espionage cases those procedures are applied in blatant denial of basic due process rights?

The anticipated amendments to the espionage law add to the already breathtaking breadth of its provisions. Acts of espionage will now include “seeking to align with an espionage organization and its agents”. The new law will protect not only state secrets and intelligence but all “other documents, data, statistics, materials and other items related to national security”. And officials are admonished, of course, to take “a holistic view of national security” in applying the terms of the law.

The new law will also proscribe espionage in China that targets a third country and will punish PRC nationals who while abroad allow themselves to be used by an espionage organization.

Reflections on Jiang Zemin

By Jerome A. Cohen

I have enjoyed the media obituaries and listserv commentaries on Jiang Zemin but hope that there will eventually be appraisals of his contributions to PRC efforts to establish government under law in the post-Tiananmen era. Some very significant criminal justice reforms were adopted when the nation’s Criminal Procedure Law was revised in 1996, and many legislative and regulatory reforms relating to the economy took place in order to make the PRC a plausible candidate for the WTO. Prime Minister Zhu Rongji played a key role regarding the latter, of course, and did recognize the importance of the rule of law to foreign investors. Yet I don’t recall Jiang Zemin saying much of significance about law reform.

I do vaguely recall my disappointment at his reaction to a question about a human rights case that I managed to get someone to ask him at an appearance in Washington. I wanted to bring to his attention - and the public’s - the arbitrary detention of a dissident whose family I was advising. He simply dismissed the question by saying that, since the Public Security Bureau had taken the action, he was sure that the government had reasonable grounds for acting. I would have been wiser to try “the back door” by asking Wang Daohan, whom I knew fairly well and who was thought to be important in promoting Jiang’s rise, to put in a quiet word for my client.

Paying Closer Attention to the U.S.'s Microchip Measures

By Jerome A. Cohen

International attention concerning China has recently been focused on the Communist Party Congress and the prospects for war over Taiwan. Insufficient attention has been paid to the extraordinary microchip measures adopted by the US Government shortly before the Party Congress. Their implementation and impact, which gives new meaning to ”containment”, requires the most careful continuing assessment.

On the one hand, I understand and support the motivation that inspires these measures. On the other hand, they may well increase the likelihood of not only a tech war but a hot war. They uncomfortably remind me of the measures that the USG belatedly adopted before Pearl Harbor in order to cease our contributions to Japan’s war potential. That understandable action reportedly led Japan’s militaristic dictatorship to conclude that war with the US was inevitable. The US and the PRC should not replay this situation but should undertake the most serious negotiations to chart a better future.

Developing a Hebrew Language Program at Peking University

By Jerome A. Cohen

I enjoyed this recent article on the teaching of Yiddish at Peking University. I am surprised, however, that it fails to mention the teaching of Hebrew at Peking University. A few years before China and Israel established diplomatic relations a law professor who was serving as a university vice president telephoned to ask my help in establishing the university’s first course in Hebrew. He not only wanted me to find an appropriate teacher who was not an Israeli citizen but also asked me to find the money to support this project for two years.

I came up with the funding through the good offices of Lawrence Tisch, who was eager to promote normalization of Sino-Israeli relations. I found an excellent teacher named Miriam R. L. Petruck among the recent PhD recipients in Hebraic studies at the University of California at Berkeley through the help of their mentor Professor Zev Brinner. There were eight students in her first class, and they were soon posted to Israel in a variety of occupations, such as a New China News Agency journalist, during the period before normalization was achieved.

Political Censorship in British Hong Kong

By Jerome A. Cohen

Michael Ng's new book looks like an important contribution to the study of free speech in Hong Kong under British rule; Mr. Ng's upcoming book talk on October 27th will be an interesting program. I wonder whether the establishment of the Universities Service Center by the Carnegie Corporation in Hong Kong in 1963-4 is mentioned in the book. The Hong Kong Government was very slow to give its approval, Carnegie’s representative was very cautious about finalizing arrangements for fear of offending the Brits and ultimately was sacked for being too ineffective.

The HKG was worried about offending the PRC and suspected that USC was going to be a CIA plant rather than a good faith home for visiting scholars of events in China. Carnegie asked me to take over arrangements for setting up the Center since I was in HK for a year of research, needed a place to work, and was a friend of several higher-ups in the UK administration as well as Lord Lawrence Kadoorie, a leading figure in the business community.

Lucian Pye, also in HK that academic year and already an established China scholar, would have been the obvious choice to lead the Carnegie effort but was deemed too close to the US Government, as he himself agreed. I recall how the seating at a dinner party was arranged so that the HKG’s foreign affairs chief could interrogate me for an evening of apparent sociability. It would be interesting to know whether HKG files reveal any of this.

Updates in Xiao Jianhua's "Trial"

By Jerome A. Cohen

Regarding the recent updates in Xiao's case, I agree with the position some scholars have taken of rebutting the PRC’s effort to rationalize its refusal to allow Canadian diplomats to attend Xiao’s trial and have access to him. The PRC’s rejection of dual nationality should mean that Xiao divested himself of Chinese nationality, not Canada’s.

This case will eventually come into public view. There are so many legal, business and political questions to be answered. I don’t recall a greater fine than the $8.1 BILLION fine imposed on Tomorrow Holdings but perhaps others can.

I wonder too at what point Xiao, following his Hong Kong kidnapping by PRC security forces, was turned over to the formal criminal process. It is interesting that he was allowed to retain China’s foremost and most expensive criminal defense lawyer, the able former law professor Tian Wenchang. Of course, the public has not been permitted to learn anything about Tian’s role in this case.

Thoughts about Brittney Griner's case in comparison with criminal prosecutions of foreigners in China

By Jerome A. Cohen

The US has lumped Griner’s case together with those of other Americans “wrongfully” detained abroad including in China. The USG has recently said Griner is being held in “intolerable circumstances”. Yet I have seen no explanation why Griner’s detention has been deemed wrongful. Was it politically motivated? Are others who bring in cannabis, as she admittedly did, usually exempted from detention and prosecution? Is it because she has unreasonably been denied bail pending trial? Is it because she has indeed been subjected to intolerable conditions in detention? The US Deputy Chief of Mission in its Moscow Embassy, even while repeating the “wrongful” accusation, has reported that Griner has been reading and doing well in detention.

Observers of Chinese criminal justice must be interested in comparisons with the Griner trial. A US diplomat who can attend the trial and chat with the accused and hand her a letter from President Biden? Media that report on the trial and statements of the accused? Defense lawyers who can discuss the case with the media? A trial that drags on for many days in the kind of case that Chinese courts – and most others – would dispose of in a couple of hours, especially when the defendant pleads guilty?

It would be good to hear more from the US State Department and specialists in Russian criminal justice in order to enhance our appreciation of what is going on. Specialists in Chinese criminal justice should also feel provoked to comment on the need for more facts and on how the same case might be handled in China.

Xiao Jianhua's "Trial"

Even by PRC standards, Xiao’s mistreatment is extraordinary, and any pretense to now resort to a belated “trial” in an effort to legitimize what has been done to him makes a farce of the Chinese legal system. Xiao’s brazen kidnapping from his Hong Kong hotel home five and a half years ago was a warning to all that Hong Kong was no longer a safe haven from the reach of Beijing’s secret police. Since then, at least until recently, he has been held in military captivity without any pretext of legal authority. Canada has proved helpless in assisting this Canadian citizen and his family, and the PRC has shamelessly violated the Sino-Canadian consular agreement (Not for the first time–recall the recent cases of the “two Michaels”). It seems evident that Canadian consular officials were banned from attending today’s “trial” even though their government, in its embarrassment, has not admitted this latest PRC violation. We do not even know what Xiao has been charged with. For the Canadian Government to withhold from the public what it knows on the ground that it is protecting Xiao’s privacy is ludicrous.

Some Questions about the Cheng Lei Prosecution

By Jerome A. Cohen

Since Thursday’s secret trial of the Australian journalist Ms. Cheng Lei, I have seen little mention of the case. Yet, as we await the Beijing court’s decision, many questions persist. Since acquittal would be a stunning surprise, I hope that quiet negotiations are taking place between the Australian and Chinese governments that will limit the sentence to prison time already served plus immediate deportation. Alternatively, her immediate release and deportation could be rationalized on the ground of alleged need for foreign medical attention even though she may be formally sentenced to a longer stretch in prison.

There are many precedents for both possible outcomes in the PRC, which regards such results as acceptable in cases that have aroused foreign outrage. Criminal conviction and sentencing are seen to vindicate PRC justice and sovereignty, and the defendant’s subsequent release is portrayed as a demonstration of Chinese munificence. I assume that the hope for leniency accounts for the apparent failure of the Australian Government to protest the exclusion of its ambassador from attending the trial as a blatant violation of the Australian-Chinese consular treaty as well as for the general reasons cited by the ambassador.

I have not seen Ambassador Graham Fletcher’s full statement issued outside the courthouse, nor any subsequent statement of his government, but the report on the case by Alice Uribe in the Wall St. Journal is worth noting. It is good to know that Ms. Cheng was allowed a recent consular visit while in pre-trial detention and that she appeared to be doing well in the circumstances, although denied the opportunity to speak with her children. It is also good to know that she is being defended by very competent lawyers of her choice. But on what basis did the ambassador conclude that the lawyers “are doing their job well”?

Has he discussed the case in detail with the lawyers? Have they had unfettered access to their client and been allowed to conduct an independent investigation? If they have received a copy of the indictment, as required by Chinese law, were they permitted to discuss it with the ambassador as well as their client? Did the lawyers themselves know the basic facts alleged so that they could at least seek to prepare a credible defense?

In many such cases defense lawyers are not allowed to share information about the case even with those who have retained them to represent the accused. And, since the trial, have the lawyers been permitted to report to Cheng’s family and the ambassador what took place at the brief secret trial? As Ambassador Fletcher rightly said outside the courthouse Thursday: “We can have no confidence in the validity of the process, which is conducted in secret.”

One thing the ambassador stated was truly puzzling. When asked whether he believes the case is a political one, he responded: “We have no reason to make that conclusion.” What? Perhaps that remark was meant to leave open the door to a behind-the-scenes negotiation leading to Ms. Cheng’s long-overdue freedom. Let’s hope so!

The Danger of Escalation in Ukraine

By Jerome A. Cohen

After a largely sleepless night worrying about what China ought to be doing to try to end the tragic and increasingly dangerous crisis over Ukraine, I awoke to this impressive warning by Ashford and Shifrinson that outlines the many possibilities for the current conflict quickly developing into World War III. I hope that elites in all relevant countries give it a careful reading. Yet it is curious that the authors make little mention of the possible role of China in extinguishing the fire.

Thus far Ukraine has cast Xi Jinping and his government in a very poor light. Have they been disingenuous in portraying their relations with Putin and his government on the eve of invasion? Were they duped? Did Xi Jinping know more about Putin’s plans and agree to more than he shared with even his own foreign minister? Since the war’s outbreak, the PRC has resembled the proverbial deer caught in the headlights, bobbing, weaving and waffling unpersuasively in an attempt to cope with multiple pressures. It is time now for it to adopt a bold, statesmanlike position and vigorously pursue the role of mediator to which it has made occasional vague reference. China has much to gain from such an effort even if mediation were to fail.

Successful mediation will not be easy, even first to achieve an effective ceasefire throughout Ukraine. Settlement terms will be harder to come by but should be achievable with the cooperation of the Western powers. For example, Ukraine could become, at least for the foreseeable future, the Switzerland of Eastern Europe. Zelensky and his government should remain in place and independent but commit to abstaining from NATO. They should also recognize the loss of Crimea and provide for a special autonomous regime within Ukraine for the two eastern provinces. Such distasteful concessions should make it possible for Russia to accept the humiliating failure of its disastrous policy. Western sanctions would obviously be diminished in accordance with progress made in implementing the terms of settlement.

China’s serious efforts to help end the war would have benefits that extend far beyond the Ukraine crisis. They could moderate the present extremely negative Western perceptions of the PRC and its policies at home and abroad and make it easier for the Biden administration and other governments to initiate measures to improve relations with Beijing despite strong domestic anti-PRC pressures. If Beijing fails to do more than unimpressively dither over Ukraine, the situation in Asia is likely to worsen as many major powers take steps to further bolster Taiwan against the PRC’s threats to use force to overwhelm the island’s admirable democracy.

Wang Yi and PRC "mediation" if "necessary"

By Jerome A. Cohen

I think PRC mediation is urgently “necessary” now from China’s perspective as well as those of the combatants. China’s international standing has been badly damaged by its appearance as a silent partner in Russia’s war. If China could now emerge as a successful mediator – a very tall order in the circumstances – it could establish a new and more positive image in the world. Blessed are the peacemakers! Both the Chinese language and Western languages endorse the wisdom of seeking to turn a vice into a virtue. Even a good faith mediation effort that failed would improve the PRC’s status.

But what is “mediation”? The term embraces a multitude of possible roles. Certainly there is no need for a third party merely to pass messages back and forth between the combatants since they have proved capable of conducting direct discussions. At the other end of the mediation spectrum, this is not a situation where the third party can exercise irresistible pressures upon the combatants to accept its proposed terms of settlement. Yet Russia’s need for PRC support to resist the impact of international sanctions gives Beijing considerable sway over the outcome if it chooses to act strongly despite the sensitivity of their “rock solid” relations.

The challenge, of course, is to find a plausible basis for settlement that will give sufficient “face” to Russia’s withdrawal without detracting from Ukraine’s earned respect for its independence and the Western world’s massive rejection of wars of aggression.

The problem now is not to avoid revival of the Cold War, since the Cold War is plainly already revived. The problem is how to end a Hot War that can become a broad catastrophe if mishandled.

Lao Dongyan's Essay on Facing the Real World

By Jerome A. Cohen

Here is an extraordinary essay that was shared before it was quickly removed from WeChat (translated by David Cowhig). It’s a good thing it’s so long. Otherwise it would not have lasted two hours! Many China-watchers will find it a worthy read. It is, of course, the seldom-published weeping of many law professors whose voices have been silenced, not only at one of China’s major law schools – Tsinghua. I wonder whether Professor Lao, a younger scholar whom I did not know during my 2002-3-4-5 autumn semesters teaching there, will now suffer the fate of her former colleague, the ex-communicated, shunned and impoverished Professor Xu Zhangrun, who is being quietly and informally but severely punished for his brilliant and courageous critiques of Xi Jinping’s repression.

This essay is not only about the plight of legal scholars, lawyers, free speech and the abuse of criminal justice. It is a Chinese intellectual’s effort to confront contemporary life. It is also a meditation on arriving at middle age (recall the PRC movie from the early post-1979 era “Ren Dao Zhongnian”) and on the responsibilities of raising children to cope with the contradictions of China’s present political, social and economic environment. Professor Lao offers many admirable sentences, and I like her concluding quotation of J.K.Rowling’s speech to Harvard graduates, which urges a path that we all might well follow.

Is Hong Kong Justice Still Fair and Independent in Sensitive Political Cases?

By Jerome A. Cohen

I recently read this good Reuters story by James Pomfret and Greg Torode about Monday's speech by Chief Justice Andrew Cheung at the annual opening ceremony of Hong Kong’s judicial year. The new chief justice provided necessary assurance to the community that the city’s judicial independence continued to be “a fact” despite recent momentous changes wrought by the new National Security Law (NSL) and related measures. He noted that Hong Kong court reports are full of cases making clear that Hong Kong judges continue to take a generous view of fundamental rights in their interpretations and narrowly confine restrictions on such rights.

Yet, at a meeting with the media following his speech, the CJ’s honest answers to questions posed by well-informed journalists inevitably cast doubt on his assurances. When asked to reveal the number and identities of those judges who have been cleared to decide national security cases (juries can now be prevented from deciding these important cases), the CJ reportedly responded that, while he could advise and make recommendations about which judges should be selected to handle such cases, it is the city’s chief executive (Carrie Lam) who is the designating authority under the NSL.

Of course, even if the CE, the city’s most powerful political official, now determines who shall decide the most politically sensitive judicial cases, that does not explain why the CJ cannot at least reveal to the public the number of special judges approved by the CE or their identities. Nor does it explain why consultations on this matter between the CE and the CJ have to remain secret and why, as the CJ admitted, it is not for the judiciary to answer for the criteria governing the choice of its members to handle these cases. It should also be noted that, according to the Court of Final Appeal itself, Hong Kong courts have now lost the power to make final determinations on relevant constitutional questions, as their recent decisions denying bail demonstrate.

This new reality is also an important “fact” of Hong Kong’s judicial independence. My heart goes out to Chief Justice Cheung, who has valiantly taken on an impossible task. (Full disclosure: he reportedly took my course on Chinese law almost forty years ago while a Harvard graduate student.)

The Positive Impact of Repression in Hong Kong

By Jerome A. Cohen

Saturday's NY Times carries an important and fascinating story by Michael Wines detailing the decision of a Florida federal judge, Mark Walker, ordering the University of Florida to stop enforcing a policy that barred six of its professors from giving expert testimony in lawsuits against the state. The judge’s ruling reportedly “accused the university of trying to silence the professors for fear that their testimony would anger state officials and legislators who control the school’s funding. Judge Walker likened that to the decision last month by Hong Kong University to remove a 25-foot sculpture marking the 1989 massacre of student protesters in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square by the Chinese military, apparently for fear of riling the authoritarian Chinese government. If the comparison distressed university officials, he wrote, ‘the solution is simple. Stop acting like your contemporaries in Hong Kong.’”

Chairman Mao reputedly once admonished us to never underestimate the power of negative examples! I don’t know where the judge got this terrific idea from – whether from his own reading, the plaintiffs’ brief or his law clerks. But this example opens up many possibilities for, as both Chinese and foreigners like to say, “turning a vice into a virtue.”

It is sad to see a major American university engaging in such repression today. It was bad enough when, sixty years ago, the University of California at Berkeley forced philosophy professor John Searles and me to cancel a program scheduled to condemn the U.S. House of Representatives Un-American Activities Committee. When we protested, the campus vice-chancellor told us the university could not afford to offend the legislature. We should have sued. Instead we both moved on to freer climes.

Is there a quiet pre-Olympics crackdown on human rights lawyers?

By Jerome A. Cohen

I was tempted not to post this report of the official disappearance of another human rights lawyer, since events like this occur so often perhaps they no longer constitute “news” and attract public interest. Yet some observers believe that a special, below-the-radar effort may have begun to prevent the PRC’s continuing harsh repression from being exposed to the media as the Winter Olympics approaches. The long-anticipated last month “trial” of the well-respected and long-confined lawyer-activists Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi may have been postponed until after the Olympics or after the 20th Party Congress at year’s end (or even the 2049 100thanniversary of the PRC’s establishment!). There has been much PRC silence about many other long-pending cases. This week’s detention of lawyer Xie Yang may be designed “merely” to remove him from society until after the Games or, unlike his previous detentions, he may this time be permanently lost to life like the famous human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng who, after repeated formal imprisonments failed to halt his protests, has simply not been heard about for several years. Like many, Gao is a victim not of Xi Jinping’s vaunted “rule by law” but of lawlessness. What should the International Olympics Committee be doing in response to this situation? The Amnesty report cited here is especially worth reading.

A Tribute to Jonathan Spence

By Jerome A. Cohen

As the significant and widespread obituaries demonstrate, all who knew Jonathan Spence or read his work will greatly miss him and his contributions. I always felt an especial admiration for him because of his appreciation of the importance of China’s traditional legal system and his encouragement of budding historians to pursue this often neglected aspect of the country’s development. In recalling the many splendid books that Jonathan produced, the obituaries that I have seen failed to mention one early work that is worthy of current attention: “The Death of Woman Wang.” Below is my 1978 review for the New York Times Book Review.


A Local History: Review of "The Death of Woman Wang" by Jonathan Spence

CHINA remains a rural nation. Well over 700 million of its almost one billion people live in the countryside. Mao Tse‐tung's genius lay in recognizing that the Chinese revolution's success would turn on the ability to mobilize and transform the peasants. Is the People's Republic succeeding in this Promethean effort?

Foreign observers can form only the most tentative appraisals. Denied sustained and free access to China's million villages, they combine fleeting personal impressions with inferences drawn from publications, radio broadcasts, refugee interviews and other sources. Visitors to communes frequently long to know what really takes place there. What do people actually think? Moreover, the problems of penetrating rural life are not only political but cultural as well, inhibiting the understanding of urban Chinese, not to mention foreigners.

During the century before the triumph of Communism in 1949 foreigners enjoyed expanding access to the Chinese countryside. The accounts of missionaries, traders, travelers, novelists and, eventually, scholars — Chinese and foreign — taught us much about at least some places. K. C. Hsiao's “Rural China in the Nineteenth Century” offered as masterful a set of generalizations as could be made about the vast and varied land.

Yet even then, China was a society in transition. To discern the impact on rural life, first of internal disintegration and imperialist intervention and then of Communist revolution, one has to establish a baseline prior to the changes that the 19th century brought with increasingly bewildering speed. Describing political, social and economic conditions in the hinterland in the pre‐modern era, however, is even more formidable a task than depicting the contemporary situation. One cannot visit the past, and there are no daily newspapers or broadcasts to monitor or refugees to interview. Nevertheless, sources can be found, and Jonathan Spence, a distinguished Yale historian, has skillfully interwoven three — a local history, a magistrate's handbook and a collection of stories by a gifted writer — to re‐create the world of an ordinary Chinese county in the latter part of the 17th century.

Professor Spence, whose previous book, “Emperor of China: Self‐Portrait of K'ang‐hsi” focused on the highest reaches of the social scale, here presents T'anch'eng in the coastal province of Shantung, “a peripheral county that had lost out in all the observable distributions of wealth, influence, and power.” He introduces “the sorrow of its history” not through a Sinological orgy of names, dates and places but by sketching the context and then ushering us into “the zones of private anger and misery” and “the realms of loneliness, sensuality, and dreams that were also a part of T'an‐ch'eng.”

His success offers a Chinese “Winesburg, Ohio,” a series of vignettes and portraits that establishes the common humanity of people separated from us by time, culture and circumstance. If the tone of Sherwood Anderson's tales is sad, Professor Spence's is depressing. Small‐town Americans in the early 20th century were less preoccupied with survival, or even economics, than with universal, intractable human dilemmas. By contrast, the residents of T'an‐ch'eng despite the fact that the newly established Manchu dynasty was approaching the zenith of its splendor played out their individuality amid the devastation, famine and epidemics brought on by recurrent natural disasters including drought, floods, locust plagues and earthquakes. These disasters in turn stimulated human plagues such as corruption, banditry, war and even cannibalism. As the author of the magistrate's handbook wrote of T'an‐ch'eng: “The area was so wasted and barren, the common people so poor and had suffered so much, that essentially they knew none of the joys of being alive.” These were the conditions that elsewhere in China produced periodic upheavals and rebellions that became the antecedents of revolution.

The special social and economic injustices suffered by the women of traditional China added fuel to the fires of revolution. “The Death of Woman Wang” shows us how virtually every aspect of T'an‐ch'eng life reflected their unfair treatment. Female infanticide was common practice, girls were fed less than boys, they were often crippled by foot‐binding that was designed to titillate the male psyche, they were frequently bought and sold to become servants, wives, concubines or prostitutes, they were discriminated against in matters of inheritance, they could not share fairly in property acquired by the family during marriage, husbands could divorce far more readily than wives, widows usually confronted great hardship, and rape was an ever‐present consequence of the countryside's insecurity. Thus, in an area where suicide was a common exit from misery, it is not surprising that women seemed to resort to it even more than men. Confucian pieties proved insufficient restraint in this respect as in others. Indeed, in certain instances, as when a childless widow killed herself out of loyalty to her late husband or a wife chose death to avoid rape, the prevailing ethic considered suicide to be morally correct.

Woman Wang, the character in the last story who lends her name to the book, chose a different escape from an unhappy marriage — running off with another man — and for this her husband eventually strangled her. Because Chinese law regarded a wife's betrayal as a major offense and provocation, he was not sentenced to death but only to a beating with the heavy bamboo and to the humiliation of a long period wearing the kangue,a large and uncomfortable wooden collar that was a badge of shame.

Resentment against the administration of justice also contributed to unrest and Professor Spence reveals the functioning of the imperial legal system at the local level. He adds to our knowledge of the cruelty and corruption of the magistrate's assistants, whose abuses were literally proverbial. He illustrates how official torture sometimes elicited false confessions from the accused, and how the powerful and rich men often manipulated the system through intimidation, bribery and other means. Yet he also shows conscientious and clever magistrates surmounting such obstacles to achieve just results and earn popular respect. Interestingly, this latter aspect of imperial justice, as well as its repressive features, is being emphasized by a traditional‐style opera and film — “Fifteen Strings of Cash” — currently being shown all over China as part of an effort to demonstrate the post‐Mao Govern- ment's interest in protecting human rights.

In fact, almost every facet of Professor Spence's historical account is relevant to those interested in the People's Republic, for, despite the great changes that have intervened, China today faces many of the same problems that confronted her new Manchu leaders three centuries ago,. How to feed people, enhance production, collect revenue, govern efficiently, allocate responsibility between local and central authorities, instill ethics, cope with corruption, curb arbitrary rule, eradicate superstition, reduce rural boredom and enlist popular enthusiasm remain as challenging now as they were then.

Is it Pious Pontification to "Remember Pearl Harbor?"

By Jerome A. Cohen

For several hours I have unsuccessfully tried to resist sending out a message about today’s significance in modern memory.  I was playing basketball in the backyard with a friend when the news came by radio from Honolulu. Since then the world has witnessed many wars, three major conflicts in East Asia alone. While scholars have long debated the origins and lessons of World War I, we in America also especially focus on the causes of World War II and the subsequent conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. Today is an appropriate time to renew our efforts to avoid yet another conflict, one that might well inflict more serious harm to mankind than even history’s most tragic precedents. I suppose we all recognize the importance of current discussions. Yet this seems a good time to recall the statement often attributed to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., that we need education in the obvious more than vindication of the obscure.

The forthcoming trial of two of China's greatest human rights lawyers and would-be political reformers–Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi

Ding Jiaxi (left) and Xu Zhiyong

By Jerome A. Cohen

After torturing these two admirable people for almost two years, the PRC finally appears ready to bring them to secret trial, probably between Christmas and the New Year in order to minimize foreign publicity. Here is a reliable two-page summary of their plight written by Lawyer Ding’s remarkable wife, Sophie Luo, who is now working in the United States for a European company while devoting all other energy to attempting to secure her husband’s freedom. She is not only as well-informed as possible about this non-transparent prosecution but also unusually articulate, thoughtful and balanced in her analysis of the overall PRC human rights situation. A Council on Foreign Relations Round Table Dialogue with her is tentatively scheduled for December 14.

One of the questions worthy of exploration is why the PRC bothers with secret and distorted legal trappings in many cases like this while using even less transparent methods to silence other reformers and critics. What purposes are served by the Chinese Communist Party’s criminal justice charades? How much has Xi Jinping learned from Stalin and how much has he “improved on” Stalin’s widely-condemned techniques?

The Forthcoming Trials of Ding Jiaxi and Xu Zhiyong

Xu Zhiyong (left) and Ding Jiaxi

By Jerome A. Cohen

I recently received a sad message from Shengchun Sophie Luo, the wife of human rights and commercial lawyer Ding Jiaxi. Ding and the terrific legal scholar and political reformer Xu Zhiyong are set to be prosecuted soon, but neither the lawyers nor family members have received any information regarding the trial dates. December 6-7 will mark the second anniversary of the Xiamen meeting in which they and about twenty other activists met for a couple of days of discussions reviewing the human rights situation in China. That led soon after to a wide scale roundup of as many of the group as could not evade arrest. Xu and Ding seem to be regarded as ringleaders of a subversive effort and are finally expected to be brought to separate trials before the year’s end. Two recent letters summarizing their plight are linked here and here and reveal the realities of the PRC criminal process, including extended and harsh incommunicado detention, persistent torture, long-delayed access to defense lawyers and illegal restrictions on defense lawyers activities.

Here are summaries of the indictments (Ding Jiaxi here and Xu Zhiyong here) and an excellent analysis of the cases by China Change.

I admire the continuing optimism that reportedly sustains the defendants’ will to resist injustice, but do not share it. Nevertheless, I hope others will do all that they can to protest these tragic abuses by the PRC even if, to borrow the traditional Chinese simile employed by the disappeared tennis star Ms, Peng Shuai, “it’s like throwing an egg against a stone!”